Abstract. A fair network payment protocol plays an important role in electronic commerce. The fairness concept in payments can be illustrated as that two parties (e.g. customers and merchants) exchange the electronic items (e.g. electronic money and goods) with each other in a fair manner that no one can gain advantage over the other even if there are malicious actions during exchanging process. In the previous works of fair payments, the buyer is usually required to sign a purchase message which can be traced by everyone. The information about where the buyer spent the money and what he purchased would easily be revealed by this way. This paper employs two techniques of off-line untraceable cash and designated confirmer signatures to construct a new fair payment protocol, in which the untraceability (or privacy) property can be achieved. A Restrictive Confirmation Signature Scheme (RCSS) will be introduced and used in our protocol to prevent the interested persons except the off-line TTP (Trusted Third Party) from tracing the buyer's spending behavior.
Introduction
How the two parties, buyer and merchant, exchange the currency and electronic goods through the network in a fair manner is the crux of the problem on electronic transactions. Since most of the electronic businesses are conducted on an open and insecure network, how to prevent the abnormal behavior, such as malicious termination of the payment process, becomes a critical security consideration on designing a fair payment protocol. A buyer who makes a payment in the network is usually worried that the merchant may refuse to deliver the soft goods though he has sent the money. On the other hand, a merchant will worry that he cannot receive the deserved money after the delivery of goods. Since these two parties do not trust each other, no one wants to send his secret data until receiving the other's.
Two approaches to the achievement of fair exchange have been proposed. The first one is that two parties exchange data simultaneously [EGL85, OO94] .
A simplified example to provide simultaneity is that they disclose the secret data bit by bit. This kind of scheme has a drawback that it requires many steps of interactions for exchanging data. In addition, one of these two parties will have an advantage of obtaining one more bit if he maliciously aborts in the middle of the protocol. The second approach is that a trusted third party (TTP) is involved in the exchange process. A straightforward method is that an on-line TTP who acts as a mediator receives the data from both parties in each transaction and then forwards them to the accurate receivers [DGLW96, ZG96] . However, TTP would become a bottleneck on communications since he takes part in all transactions, including the normal cases in which two parties honestly deliver their data. To improve the performance, a novel model called the offline TTP has been proposed. In this model, TTP is required to participate in the exchange protocols only when the abnormal terminations or faults occur [ASW00,ZG97,BDM98, BF98, Che98] . That means TTP is always able to solve the disputes between two parties but he need not take part in all transactions.
Previously, fair payments seemed to be achieved by use of fair exchange on signatures. For example, two parties can exchange the secret message (soft goods) and the signatures on purchase information. In [ASW98,BDM98,ASW00], a general concept of the fair exchange on signature with off-line TTP is explicated as that one party A sends the encrypted signature to B and convinces B that it is valid and can be decrypted by TTP, without revealing the content of signature. If B completes the verification, he will send his signature (or secret data) to A. In a normal case, A should send his correct signature to B after he received B's signature. However, if A maliciously aborts the protocol and refuses to send B his signature, B can deliver A's encrypted signature to the off-line TTP for decryption. The main technique used in these papers is called verifiable encryption protocol or escrow system [Sta96, Mao97] . However, a generic and efficient construction on verifiable encryption is difficult to implement. Bao et al. [BDM98] in their paper proposed a special implementation with the modified GQ signature algorithm, in which they claimed that the verifiable encryption protocol of the scheme was quite efficient. Unfortunately, Boyd et al. showed that the fairness could be destroyed because the receiver (or any observer) could directly calculate the sender's signature from the encrypted signature without the help of TTP [BF98] .
Recently, Boyd et al. [BF98] and Chen [Che98] proposed the efficient fair exchange protocols with off-line TTP by using verifiable confirmation signatures (Boyd et al. called them designated converter signatures to emphasize their conversion property). A designated third party, e.g. TTP, can verify the original signatures with interactive protocol or convert the signatures into the self-authenticated signatures which can be verified by everyone. Their proposed schemes are generic constructions for fair exchange and can efficiently run over the Internet.
Our Contributions. Pervious works of fair exchange are not really suitable for many applications on network payments because they are only used to exchange the confidential data or signatures. Especially, many payment applications need to protect the buyer's purchase privacy, which has never been considered in the previous papers. In our view, a complete solution for fair payment should contain payment actions, such as electronic cash or network credit card method, instead of simply signing the purchase information. Our proposed protocol is the first work to provide a protection on buyer's privacy and it can be regarded as a process of fairly exchanging electronic coins and secret information. The main contributions in this paper are listed as follows:
1. Propose a generic model for real fair network payments. 2. Apply a subtle tool of Restrictive Confirmation Signature Scheme (RCSS) to achieve the property of untraceability. 3. Design a new technique of pseudo e-coin to achieve fairness of exchanging the electronic cash. 4. Demonstrate how to construct a practical and efficient fair network payment protocol based on the Brands' e-cash scheme [Bra93b] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the basic model of untraceable fair payment protocol in Section 2. In Section 3, we introduce an useful scheme called Restrictive Confirmation Signature Scheme (RCSS), a basic component for establishing our new protocol. In Section 4, we combines the RCSS and the Brands' electronic cash scheme to realize our protocol. In Section 5, we show the security analysis and properties discussion. Finally, the concluding remarks and future researches are given in Section 6.
The Basic Model
We abstractly describe our works in this section. Assume that four parties: the buyer (U), the merchant (M), the bank (B) and the trusted third party (TTP) are involved in the protocol. In a general e-cash scheme, fairness can not be achieved because the buyer is required to send true electronic coins (e-coins) to the merchant. Instead, this paper designs a technique of pseudo e-coin which can be converted to a true one by TTP. The buyer applies the Restrictive Confirmation Signature Scheme (RCSS) (described in Section 3) to sign an order agreement that contains the buyer's and the merchant's names, price of goods, purchase date/information and some other parameters. The RCSS can properly protect the buyer's purchase information by restricting the confirmer's confirmation capability on the signature. Three procedures similar to a general e-cash (withdrawal, payment and deposit) are briefly depicted in the following. When a dispute occurs, the TTP is required to participate in an additional procedure Disputes to force the completion of the payment process. Withdrawal. The buyer U withdraws the money from the bank B. A blind signature applied here can guarantee the unlinkability for the bank. The withdrawal procedure in our protocol is the same as the one in the general e-cash scheme. After this procedure, U obtains an electronic coin which can be directly paid to the merchant. Payment. The buyer U and the merchant M exchange the electronic money and goods in this procedure. We assume U and M negotiate an order agreement that contains merchandise items and price. The buyer U then sends enough pseudo e-coins and a signature of RCSS on the order agreement to M. To prevent the merchant from maliciously delivering the flawed goods, the buyer doesn't send true e-coins to the merchant until he checks and accepts the goods.
1. The buyer U selects the goods from merchant M's web and signs an order agreement:
where Disputes. Two possible disputes may occur during payment. M may refuse to send U the goods or cheat U by sending flawed goods. In this case, U will not send the true e-coins to M if he does not receive or accept the goods. On the other hand, U may refuse to send the true e-coins to M after he receives the valid goods. If so, M will begin the following procedure to ask T T P convert the pseudo e-coins into true ones.
1. The merchant M sends pseudo e-coins, OA and θ to T T P and proves that θ is a valid signature and truly signed by U. Note that no one except M and T T P can be convinced that θ is valid, since RCSS is applied to the construction of θ.
M privately sends goods to T T P . T T P checks whether the specification of
the goods is consistent with the field of goods description written on OA. If yes, T T P sends M a transformation certificate (T Cer) which can be used for the conversion of the pseudo e-coins.
An abnormal action is addressed here that M may abort the step 3 in the payment procedure and directly ask T T P to send him T Cer after he receives the pseudo e-coins. However, M must send T T P the valid goods since T T P has the responsibility to carefully check the goods specification. Deposit. Generally, the merchant M can forward the payment transcript, including the true e-coins, to the bank. However, if the payment process is maliciously aborted by U, M can sends the partial payment transcript with pseudo e-coins plus the transformation certificate (T Cer) delivered by T T P to the bank for deposit.
The Restrictive Confirmation Signature Scheme
In the general designated confirmer signature [Cha94,Oka94,MS98,NMV99], a confirmer can help every recipient prove the validity of the signature to others. That means the confirmer has the complete capability of deciding who will benefit from being convinced by a signature. However, this property doesn't meet the requirements of our protocol. In this section, we will illustrate how to construct a Restrictive Confirmation Signature Scheme (RCSS). The basic structure of RCSS is similar to [WC03] but both schemes have different purposes. The concept of RCSS is that we disallow that the confirmer arbitrarily chooses the verifiers; the signer predetermines one or more verifiers whom the confirmer can convince later. We provide a nice approach to add the simulatability into an undeniable signature [CA89, Cha90, CHP92, GKR97] . Hence the signer can later create the proofs in an non-interactive way to delegate confirmer the capability of confirmation of the signature.
In the following, we first give some informal definitions and techniques used in this scheme. The following example was suggested by [BCC88, JSI96] .
Definition 2. (Trap-Door Commitment (also see [BCC88,JSI96])). Let c be a function with input (y, u, v). The notation y denotes the public key of the user whose corresponding secret key is x, u is a value committed to and v is a random number. We say c is a trap-door commitment if and only if it satisfies

Trap-door commitment Example
Let p and q be two large primes and q|p − 1. The notation g denotes a generator of the subgroup, G q , of Z * p of prime order q. The recipient's secret key is x ∈ Z q * and the corresponding public key is y = g x mod p. The sender randomly selects v ∈ Z q * and commits the value u ∈ Z q into c as the following:
The sender sends (u, v) to the recipient for decommitting.
Trap-door Commitment for Multiple Recipients
Jakobsson et al. [JSI96] proposed an efficient trap-door commitment scheme for multiple recipients P i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n. They modified the commitment to be [FOO92] .
Construction of RCSS
The previous works of designated confirmer signatures used the general selfauthenticated signature (e.g. RSA, Schnorr [Sch91] and extended Fait-Shamir scheme) to construct their schemes. However, it is difficult for these schemes to restrict the confirmer's confirmation capability. Here, we use the messagedependent proof of equality (in Definition 3 and Definition 4) and non-interactive undeniable signature [JSI96] to construct the RCSS. We also use a = g t mod p and b = y C t mod p, where y C denotes the confirmer's public key, to add the simulatability to the signature. In addition, we slightly modify the hinging method described in the scheme of [Cha94] and [MS98] . The following procedure demonstrates how to pre-determine a single verifier for a signer; however, it is easy to construct an extended scheme to multiple verifiers.
-System Setup. The parameters p, q and g are the same ones described previously, and F 1 , F 2 are two collision resistant hash functions. The secret key/public key pairs of the signer S, the confirmer C, the recipient R and the verifier V are (
, respectively. -Signing Protocol. Assume the signer has signed a undeniable signature (a, b, δ) on message m related to the confirmer's public key, i.e., a = g t mod p, b = y C t mod p and δ = (F 1 (m||a) + b) x S mod p (note that t is randomly selected by S). For delegating C the ability of confirming this signature, the signer randomly selects k, u, v 1 , v 2 and constructs a proof of
Note that we eliminate the first parameter m in P roof DV LogEQ because the message has been included in other parameters: F 1 (m||a) + b and δ. Thus, the RCSS on m denotes Sign RCSS (S, C, V, m) = (a, b, u, v 1 , v 2 , w, z, δ). -Proof by the Signer. In the original definition of designated confirmer signature scheme, the signer can convince the recipient R that a confirmer C can help R prove the validity of the signature to V . However, according to our basic model in Section 2, the confirmer C also plays the role of the recipient R. That means C will be convinced that he is able to prove the validity of the signature to V in this procedure. C checks the proof by computing c = ((g u y V v1 mod p)||(g u y C v2 mod p)) and verifying
To prove the relation of a and b, the signer needs to run the interactive protocol of bi-proof BP (g, a, y C , b) (see Definition 5) to show log g (a) ≡ log y C (b). = Eb F (a,E) [Cha94] .
Security of RCSS
Here, some security properties will be considered for RCSS. 
The verifier cannot distinguish between the correct signature and simulated signature because he knows nothing about the discrete logarithm of a * to the base g and b * to the base y C . Hence, without confirmer's help, the verifier would not be convinced that both discrete logarithms of a * and b * are equal. The indistinguishability of RCSS can also be proved by Decision-Diffie-Hellman assumption [MS98] .
The following lemma shows that no one except the confirmer C and the designated verifier V can be convinced that the RCSS is correctly constructed and truly signed by S. Note that C and V can be convinced by the proof of the signature because they know their secret keys have not been compromised; however, others cannot obtain this conviction since they know that C and V are able to collude to create a simulated transcript to cheat them.
Lemma 1. (Simulating Transcripts of RCSS). The confirmer C and designated verifier V can collude to create a simulated transcript of RCSS without
accessing the signer's secret key x S . Assume that V randomly selects α 1 and computes c 1 = g α1 mod p, and C randomly selects α 2 and computes c 2 = g α2 mod p. Thus they can compute the following simulated transcript by cooperatively choosing the random numbers β, τ, z ∈ Z q * :
V and C individually computes v 1 and v 2 as below:
The Realization of Our Fair Network Payment Model
Brands in 1993 proposed a nice approach to untraceable electronic cash [Bra93b] .
In this section, we will present an untraceable fair payment protocol based on a modification of Brands scheme. We develop a pseudo e-coin technique combined into the payment procedure. Some mathematic definitions are omitted here, and the reader can refer [Bra93b] for further details.
The concept of pseudo e-coin technique is to create a designated confirmer signature (DCS) by which the merchant can be convinced that there exists a trusted third party (TTP) who can convert DCS into a self-authenticated signature. Therefore, if the merchant later does not receive the true e-coins from the buyer, he would ask TTP for a transformation certificate T Cer.
We explicate an off-line fair payment in the following procedures. For simplifying the notation, we redefine all symbols in this section except some common parameters such as p, q and g (Note that the symbols used in this section have different definitions from that in Section 3). Setup. Let p and q be two large primes as defined in Section 3. The bank B publishes a generator-tuple (g, g 1 , g 2 ) in G q and two collision-resistant hash functions H :
B also generates a random number x B ∈ Z * q as his secret key corresponding to a public key y B = g x B mod p. Account Opening. The buyer U randomly selects u 1 ∈ Z q * and transmits I = g 1 u1 mod p to B if Ig 2 = 1. The identifier I used to uniquely identify U can be regarded as the account number of U. Then B publishes g 1 x B mod p and g 2 x B mod p so that U can compute z = (Ig 2 )
The buyer U performs the following protocol to withdraw a single e-coin from the bank:
1. B randomly selects w ∈ Z * q and sends e 1 = g w mod p and e 2 = (Ig 2 ) w mod p to U.
If the above verifications pass, the merchant M sends the soft goods to the buyer U. 6. The buyer U checks the soft gooods delivered by M. If it is flawless, he releases t ci , for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, to the merchant M. Since each one can check a ci = g tci mod p and b ci = y T T P tci mod p by himself, the coin
> denotes a true e-coin that can be directly cashed from the bank.
Disputes. If U refuses to send t ci to the merchant M (see the Step 6 in the Payment procedure), M will begin the dispute process in which the TTP can convert the pseudo e-coins into the true e-coins.
1. The merchant M sends the order agreement OA, the signature θ, soft goods and pseudo e-coins
The TTP checks the validity of the soft goods, pseudo e-coins and signature θ. If the pseudo e-coins are constructed properly, the soft goods transmitted from M is consistent with the description in OA, and θ is valid, TTP sends M a transformation certificate T Cer = (E ci , T ci ), for i = 1, 2, · · · , n, to M, where E ci = a σi ci mod p (σ i is a random number selected by TTP) and
The transformation certificate can be used to verify the relation of a ci and b ci by the following equation:
3. TTP sends the soft goods to the buyer U.
Deposit. In a normal case, M forwards the payment transcript and the true e-coins
the bank for deposit. Nevertheless, if the buyer U maliciously aborts the payment process, M can start the dispute process to acquire the T Cer from TTP. In this situation, the pseudo e-coins
can be the valid tokens for deposit. We also can regard
> as a true ecoin with different form.
Security Issues
The security of our new protocol relies on Brands' e-cash scheme and RCSS. The following properties are provided to prove the fairness and untraceability which are both pivotal features in our protocol.
Proposition 1. (Unforgeability). No one except U can create his own pseudo e-coins < A
This proposition holds because the Brand's e-cash scheme is secure. The possible scenario of forging the e-coins is that the attacker randomly selects According to Proposition 1, a simulated pseudo e-coin can be represented
Any interested party, such as a bank, cannot distinguish between a properly constructed pseudo e-coin and a simulated pseudo e-coin without the help of the buyer or TTP, because the bank knows nothing about the discrete logarithm of a * ci to the base g and b * ci to the base y T T P . That means the bank cannot be convinced that the discrete logarithms of both a * ci and b * ci are equal. This property indicates the fairness that even if the buyer U sent the pseudo e-coins to the merchant M before he receives the soft goods, the merchant M cannot gain the advantage over U.
Proposition 3. (Convertibility). If M accepts the pseudo e-coins, it is guaranteed that TTP can later convert the pseudo e-coins into the true e-coins which can be directly deposited in the bank.
This proposition can be proven by the confirmation signatures [Cha94, MS98] . The merchant M cannot accept an invalid pseudo e-coin except with negligible probability.
Lemma 2. (Fairness). If the propositions of unforgeability, indistinguishability, and convertibility hold for our newly proposed payment protocol, it can be guaranteed that, at the end of the transaction, the buyer U can obtain the soft goods if and only if the merchant M can gain the equivalent true e-coins.
Clearly, if two parties of U and M are honest, the fairness can be achieved without interacting with TTP. The rest of the condition is that one of U and M is dishonest. The unforgeability can guarantee that U cannot fool M by delivering the invalid pseudo e-coins, and the convertibility can prevent U from refusing to send true e-coins or sending the forged e-coins to M. On the other hand, if M is dishonest, he may refuse to send valid goods to U after he receives the valid pseudo e-coins. However, because of the indistinguishability, M cannot receive the useful e-coins for deposit if he cheats during the payment procedure. This lemma holds because the signature θ is created by RCSS. Thus M can only convince TTP that θ is really signed by U. The security of RCSS has been discussed in Section 3. This lemma can be proven by using blind signature property of withdrawal procedure in [Bra93b] .
Coin Size. Compared to the Brands' scheme, the individual coin of our protocol has extra three items: a c , b c and t c . The total size of these items is 2|p| + |q|. Especially, in the dispute condition, TTP is required to release T Cer with the size of |p| + |q|.
Conclusions
Electronic cash is considered to have a significant advantage over network credit card because the former can properly protect the buyer's payment privacy. In the proposed paper, we have presented a general model in which two parties can fairly exchange the electronic cash and soft goods. Our new scheme is also the first one that can provide the untraceability property on fair payments.
The future research is addressed here that we are planning to design the fair payment protocols with other payment tools, such as the electronic check and the divisible electronic cash. The privacy property, for which we have constructed a generic model, is a critical issue on the design of our future work.
